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Abstract
This article is the first of an intended series of works on the model the-
ory of Ultrafinitism. It is roughly divided into two parts. The first one
addresses some of the issues related to ultrafinitistic programs, as well as
some of the core ideas proposed thus far. The second part of the paper
presents a model of ultrafinitistic arithmetics based on the notion of fuzzy
initial segments of the standard natural numbers series. We also introduce
a proof theory and a semantics for ultrafinitism through which feasibly
consistent theories can be treated on the same footing as their classically
consistent counterparts. We conclude with a brief sketch of a foundational
program, that aims at reproducing the transfinite within the finite realm.
1 Preamble
To the memory of our unforgettable friend Stanley ”Stan” Tennen-
baum (1927− 2005), Mathematician, Educator, Free Spirit
As we have mentioned in the abstract, this article is the first one of a series
dedicated to ultrafinitistic themes.
First papers often tend to take on the dress of manifestos, road maps, or both,
and this one is no exception. It is the revised version of an invited conference
talk, and was meant from the start for a quite large audience of philosophers,
logicians, computer scientists, and mathematicians, who might have some in-
terest in the ultrafinite. Therefore, neither the philosophico-historical, nor the
mathematical side, are meant to be detailed investigations. Instead, a number
of items, proposals, questions, etc. are raised, which will be further explored in
subsequent works of the series.
Our chief hope is that readers will find the overall ”flavor” a bit ”Tennen-
baumian”. And friends of Stan, old and new, know what we mean . . .
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2 Introduction: the Radical Wing of Construc-
tivism
In their encyclopedic work on Constructivism in Mathematics ([14]), A. Troel-
stra and D. Van Dalen dedicate only a small section to Ultrafinitism (UF in
the following). This is no accident: as they themselves explain therein, there
is no consistent model theory for ultrafinitistic mathematics. It is well-known
that there is a plethora of models for intuitionist logic and mathematics (re-
alizability models, Kripke models and their generalization based on category
theory, etc.). Thus, a skeptical mathematician who does not feel committed
to embrace the intuitionist faith (and most do not), can still understand and
enjoy the intuitionist’s viewpoint while remaining all along within the confines
of classical mathematics. Model theory creates, as it were, the bridge between
quite different worlds.
It would be desirable that something similar were available for the more radical
positions, that go under the common banner of Ultrafinitism. To be sure, in
the fifteen years since the publication of the cited book, some proposals have
emerged to fill the void. We still feel, though, that nothing comparable to the
sturdy structure of model theory for intuitionism is available thus far. This
article is the first one in a series that aims at proposing several independent but
related frameworks for UF.
Before embarking on this task, though, an obvious question has to be addressed
first:
What is Ultrafinitism, really?
It turns out that to provide a satisfactory answer is no trivial task. Of course,
one could simply answer: all positions in foundation of mathematics that are
more radical than traditional constructivism (in its various flavors). This an-
swer would beg the question: indeed, what makes a foundational program that
radical?
There is indeed at least one common denominator for ultrafinitists, namely the
deep-seated mistrust for all kinds of infinite, actual and potential alike. Having
said that, it would be tempting to conclude that UF is quite simply the rejection
of infinity in favor of the study of finite structures (finite sets, finite categories),
a program that has been partly carried out in some quarters. For instance in
Finite Model Theory (see the excellent online notes written by Jouko Vannae-
nen [16]).
Luckily (or unluckily, depending on reader’s taste), things are not that straight-
forward, on account of at least two substantive points:
• First, the rejection of infinitary methods, even the ones based on the
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so-called potential infinite, must be applied at all levels, including meta-
mathematics and logical rules. Both syntax and semantics must be changed
to fit the ultrafinitistic paradigm. Approaches such as Finite Model The-
ory are simply not radical enough for the task a hand, as they are still
grounded in a semantics and syntax that is deeply entrenched with the
infinite.
• Second, barring one term in the dichotomy finite-infinite, is, paradoxically,
an admission of guilt: the denier implicitly agrees that the dichotomy itself
stands solid. But does it? Perhaps the black-white chessboard should be
replaced with various tonalities of grey.
These two points must be addressed by a convincing model theory of Ultra-
finitism. This means that such a model theory (assuming that anything like it
can be produced), must be able to generate classical (or intuitionistic) struc-
tures, let us call them ultrafinitistic universes, wherein an hypothetical ultra-
finitist mathematician can live forever happily. The dweller of those universes
should be able to treat certain finite objects as de facto infinite.
Logicians are quite used to the– inside versus outside– pattern of thought: it
suffices to think of the minimal model of ZF to get the taste (inside the minimal
model countable ordinals look and feel like enormous cardinals, to quote just
one blatant effect). It seems that, if we could ”squeeze” the minimal model
below ℵ0, we could get what we are looking for.
Only one major obstacles stands in the way: the apparently absolute charac-
ter of the natural number series.
But it is now time for a bit of history . . .
3 Short History and Prehistory of Ultrafinitism.
The trouble with eternity is that one never knows when it will end.
Sam Stoppard, Rosenkranz and Guildenstern Are Dead.
Ultrafinitism has, quite ironically, a very long prehistory. Indeed, it extends
into and encroaches the domains of cultural anthropology and child cognitive
psychology: some ”primitive” cultures, and children alike, do not seem to have
even a notion of arbitrarily large numbers. To them, the natural number series
looks a bit like: -One, two, three, . . . , many!-. An exploration of these allur-
ing territories would bring us too far afield, so we shall restrict our tale to the
traditional beginning of western culture, the Greeks (our version here is only a
sketch. For a more exhaustive and analytical investigation, see our [17]).
Ancient Greek mathematical work does not explicitly treat the ultrafinite. It is
therefore all the more interesting to note that early Greek poetry, philosophy,
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and historical writing incorporate two notions that are quite relevant for the
study of the ultrafinite. These notions are epitomized by two words: Murios
(µυριoς) and Apeiro¯n (απǫιρων).
Murios
The term murios has two basic senses, each of which is used in specific ways.
These senses are ’very many’/ ’a lot of’; and ’ten thousand.’ The first sense
denotes an aggregate or quantity whose exact number is either not known or
not relevant; the second denotes a precise number. With some exceptions, to
be detailed below, the syntax and context make clear which sense is intended in
each case. It is part of the aim of this paper to draw attention to the importance
of contextualized usage in understanding the ultrafinite.
The earliest occurrences of the term murios appear in the oldest extant Greek
writing, viz., Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. In Homer, all 32 instances of forms
of murios have the sense ’very many’/ ’a lot of.’ Translations often render the
word as ’numberless,’ ’countless,’ or ’without measure.’ What exactly does this
mean: does murios refer to an indefinite number or quantity, to an infinite num-
ber or quantity, to a number or quantity that is finite and well-defined but that
is not feasibly countable for some reason, or to a number or quantity that the
speaker deems large but unnecessary to count? Our investigation reveals that
Homer tends to use the term in the last two ways, that is, to refer to numbers
or quantities for which a count or measure would be unfeasible, unnecessary, or
not to the point. In general, Homer uses the word in situations where it is not
important to know the exact number of things in a large group, or the exact
quantity of some large mass.
Some representative examples of Homer’s usages of murios : (a) At Iliad 2.468,
the Achaeans who take up a position on the banks of the Scamander are murioi
(plural adjective), ”such as grow the leaves and flowers in season.” The leaves
and flowers are certainly not infinite in number, nor are they indefinite in num-
ber, but they are not practicably countable, and there is no reason to do so - it
is enough to know that there are very many all over. (b) In the previous exam-
ple, the Achaeans must have numbered at least in the thousands. murios can,
however, be used to refer to much smaller groups. At Iliad 4.434, the clamoring
noise made by the Trojans is compared to the noise made by muriai ewes who
are being milked in the courtyard of a very wealthy man (the ewes are bleating
for their lambs). The number of ewes owned by a man of much property would
certainly be many more than the number owned by someone of more moderate
means, but that rich man’s ewes - especially if they all fit in a courtyard - must
number at most in the low hundreds. This suggests that the ewes are said to
be muriai in number because there are a comparatively large number of them;
because there is no need to count them (a man who had 120 ewes and was
considered very wealthy would not cease to be considered very wealthy if he
lost one or even ten of them; the Sorites paradox is later); and possibly because
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it might not be practicable to count them (they might be moving around, and
they all look rather like one another).
Similarly, at Odyssey 17.422 Odysseus says he had murioi slaves at his home
in Ithaca before he left for the Trojan war. The word for ’slaves’ in this case
is dmo¯es, indicating that these are prisoners of war. Given what we know of
archaic Greek social and economic structures, the number of slaves of this type
that a man in his position could have held must have been in the dozens at most.
The key to Odysseus’ use of the term is the context. The sentence as a whole
reads, ”And I had murioi slaves indeed, and the many other things through
which one lives well and is called wealthy.” That is, the quantities of slaves and
of other resources that he commanded were large enough to enable him to be
considered wealthy. The exact number of slaves might have been countable, but
it would have been beside the point to count them. (c) murios can also refer to
quantities that are not such as to be counted. At Odyssey 15.452, a kidnapped
son of a king is projected to fetch a murios price as a slave. Here murios must
mean ’very large,’ ’vast.’ This is by no means to say that the price will be
infinite or indefinite, for a price could not be thus. Rather, the situation is that
the exact price cannot yet be estimated, and the characters have no need to
estimate it (i.e., they are not trying to raise a specific amount of money). Prices
are not countable, but they are of course measurable or calculable. There are
also instances of murios in Homer that refer to kinds of things that do not seem
to be measurable or calculable. At Iliad 18.88, Achilles says that his mother
Thetis will suffer murios grief (penthos) at the death of Achilles, which is im-
minent. At 20.282, murios distress comes over the eyes of Aeneas as he battles
Achilles.
The usual translation of murios here is ’measureless’. This translation may
be somewhat misleading if it is take literally, as there is no evidence that the
Greeks thought that smaller amounts of grief and distress were necessarily such
as to be measurable or measured. A more appropriate translation might be
’vast’ or ’overwhelming.’ It is possible that Achilles means that Thetis will suf-
fer grief so vast that she will never exhaust it nor plumb its depths even though
she is immortal; but it is also possible that Homer did not consider whether
grief or distress could be unending and infinite or indefinite in scope.
The epic poet Hesiod (8th-7th BCE) and the historian Herodotus (5th BCE)
sometimes use murios in the senses in which Homer does, but they also use
it to mean ten thousand. With a very few exceptions, the syntax and context
make clear in each instance which meaning is present. At Works and Days
252, Hesiod says that Zeus has tris murioi immortals (i.e. divinities of various
kinds) who keep watch over mortals, marking the crooked and unjust humans
for punishment. Tris means three times or thrice, and there is no parallel in
Greek for understanding tris murioi as ”three times many” or ”three times a
lot.” There are parallels for understanding tris with an expression of quantity as
three times a specific number; and the specific number associated with murios
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is ten thousand. Therefore tris murios should indicate thirty thousand. Some
instances of murios in Herodotus clearly refer to quantities of ten thousand;
some clearly refer to large amounts whose exact quantities are unspecified; and
a few are ambiguous but do not suggest any meaning other than these two.
(d) At 1.192.3, Herodotus says that the satrap Tritantaechmes had so much
income from his subjects that he was able to maintain not only warhorses but
eight hundred (oktakosioi) other breeding stallions and hexakischiliai kai muriai
mares. Hexakischiliai means six times one thousand, so that the whole expres-
sion should read six thousand plus muriai. The next line tells us that there are
twenty (eikosi) mares for every stallion, so that the total number of mares must
be sixteen thousand, and muriai must mean ten thousand (it is a plural adjec-
tive to agree with the noun). The case is similar at 2.142.2-3. Here Herodotus
says that three hundred (trie¯kosiai) generations of men come to muriai years
since three generations come to one hundred (hekaton) years. Clearly, muriai
means ten thousand here.
(e) In some places, Herodotus cannot be using murios to mean ten thousand,
and it is the context that shows this. At 2.37.3, for example, describing the
activities of Egyptian priests, he says that they fulfill muriai religious rituals,
ho¯s eipein logo¯i. He may in fact mean that they fulfill muriai rituals each day,
since the rest of the sentence speaks of their daily bathing routines. Herodotus
does not give any details about the rituals or their number, and ho¯s eipein logo¯i
means ”so to speak.” Thus Herodotus seems to be signalling that he is not giv-
ing an exact figure, and muriai must simply mean ”a great many.” At 2.148.6,
Herodotus reports that the upper chambers of the Egyptian Labyrinth tho¯ma
murion pareichonto, furnished much wonder, so remarkably were they built and
decorated. Certainly no particular amount of wonder is being specified here.
(f) Some occurrences of murios are ambiguous in a way that is of interest for
the study of the ultrafinite. At 1.126.5, Cyrus sets the Persians the enormous
task of clearing an area of eighteen or twenty stadia (2 1/4 or 2 1/2 miles) on
each side in one day, and orders a feast for them the next. He tells them that
if they obey him, they will have feasts and muria other good things without
toil or slavery, but that if they do not obey him, they will have anarithme¯toi
toils like that of the previous day. That is, Cyrus is contrasting muria good
things with anarithme¯toi bad ones. Is he asking the Persians to consider this a
choice between comparable large quantities? If so, a murios amount would be
anarithm?tos, which can mean either ”unnumbered” or ”innumerable, number-
less.” It is also possible that murios is supposed to mean ten thousand, so that
the magnitude of the undesirable consequences of defying Cyrus is greater than
the great magnitude of the advantages of obeying him. If that is the mean-
ing, Herodotus may be using murios in a somewhat figurative sense, as when
one says today that one has ”ten thousand things to do today.” murios , then,
referred in the earliest recorded Greek thought to large numbers or amounts.
When it did not refer to an exact figure of ten thousand, it referred to numbers
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or amounts for which the speaker did not have an exact count or measurement.
Our analysis indicates that the speaker might lack such a count or measure-
ment either because the mass or aggregate in question could not practicably
be counted or measured under the circumstances, or because an exact count or
measurement would not add anything to the point the speaker was making. In
most cases it is clear that the numbers and amounts referred to as murios were
determinate and finite, and could with appropriate technology be counted or
measured. In instances where it is not clear whether that which is referred to
as murios is supposed to be such as to admit of measuring or counting (Thetis’
grief, for example; and Cyrus’ murios good things if they are comparable to the
anarithme¯tos), there is no evidence as to whether the murios thing or things are
supposed to be infinite or indefinite in scope. Indeed, there is no evidence that
these early writers thought about this point. (This is perhaps why anarithme¯tos
can mean both ”unnumbered” and ”innumerable,” and why it is often difficult
to tell which might be meant and whether a writer has in mind any distinction
between them.)
When murios does not mean ”ten thousand,” context determines the order
of quantity to which it refers. Any number or amount that is considered to be
”a lot” or ”many” with respect to the circumstances in which it is found can
be called murios . Leaves and flowers in summer near the Scamander number
many more than those of other seasons, perhaps in the millions; but the rich
man’s ewes are muriai too, even if they number perhaps a hundred. They are
several times more than the average farmer has, and they may fill the courtyard
so much that they cannot easily be counted.
Apeiron
Since murios seems to refer overwhelmingly to determinate and finite quan-
tities, it is useful to note that Greek had ways of referring to quantities that
were indeterminate, unlimited, indefinite, or infinite. The most significant of
these, for philosophical and mathematical purposes, was the word apeiros or
apeiro¯n (m., f.)/ apeiron (n.).
The etymology of this word is generally understood to be peirar or peras, ”limit”
or ”boundary,” plus alpha-privative, signifying negation: literally, ”not limited”
or ”lacking boundary.” Etymology alone does not tell us the range of uses of
the term or the ways in which it was understood, so we must again consider
its occurrences in the earliest sources. The term appears as early as Homer,
in whose poems it generally refers to things that are vast in extent, depth, or
intensity.
Homer uses apeiros most frequently of expanses of land or sea. In each case,
the apeiros/apeiro¯n thing is vast in breadth or depth; whether its limits are
determinable is not clear from the context, but limits do seem to be implied in
these cases. Some instances may imply a surpassing of some sort of boundaries
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or borders (though not necessarily of all boundaries or borders). At Iliad 24.342
and Odyssey 1.98 and 5.46, a god swiftly crosses the apeiron earth. Within the
context, it is clear that the poet means that the divinity covers a vast distance
quickly. There may be a further implication that the gods transcend or tra-
verse boundaries (be these natural features or human institutions) with ease, so
that the world has no internal borders for them. Similarly, in Od. 17.418, the
expression kat’ apeirona gaian, often translated as ”through[out] the boundless
earth,” is used to suggest that something is spread over the whole earth. What
is spread covers a vast expanse, and it also crosses all boundaries on the earth.
Two other Homeric examples are of interest. At Od. 7.286, a sleep is described
as apeiron, meaning either that it is very deep, or unbroken, or both. At Od.
8.340, strong bonds are apeiron, surpassing limits of a god’s strength, and so
unbreakable.
Hesiod also uses apeiron to describe things that extend all over the earth, but
also uses the word once in reference to a number. In Shield of Heracles 472,
the word refers to a large number of people from a great city involved in the
funeral of a leader; the sense seems to be that there were uncountably many,
and possibly that the leader’s dominion had been vast.
Herodotus (5th century BCE) uses apeiron in two cases where its meaning
clearly derives from the privative of peirar. 1 In 5.9 he uses it to refer to a
wilderness beyond Thracian settlements. In 1.204 a plain is apeiron, perhaps
hugely or indeterminately vast. In both cases, Herodotus knows that the lands
are definite in extent (he identifies the peoples who live beyond them). The
contexts suggest that he means that these lands are vast and that their exact
boundaries are not known. He may also have in mind that they cannot be easily,
if at all, traversed by humans. 2
The first and perhaps best-known philosophical use of apeiron is in the re-
ports about the work of Anaximander in the sixth century BCE. Anaximander
is reported to have held that the source of all familiar things, the fundamental
generative stuff of the cosmos, was something apeiron. The testimonia report
that the apeiron was eternal in duration, unlimited or indeterminate in extent,
and qualitatively indeterminate.3 It was neither fire, nor water, nor air, nor
1Herodotus also uses a homophone word that is derived from another root, so we have
only included instances where context clearly indicates that the word is the one derived from
peirar.
2Kahn ([34]) argues that ”[t]he true sense of apeiros is therefore ’what cannot be passed
over or traversed from end to end.’” He admits, however, that Homer’s gods traverse the
earth and sea that Homer calls apeiron. For the term to have the sense of ’untraversible,’
it would have to be understood as an exaggeration in Homer and Herodotus. Gods and
rivers, for example, do traverse the things described as apeiron, but it is extremely difficult
or impractical for humans to do so. An alternative to this interpretation would be to say that
the term does not denote untraversibility, though it may connote that in some cases, and that
it instead denotes vastness and often practical indeterminability.
3Anaximander’s fundamental entity is generally referred to as ’the apeiron,’ since he did
not give it another name and did not say what it was in any other way. Adjectives, especially
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earth, nor hot, cold, light, dark, etc.; but it was that which could give rise to all
of these. 4 All of the familiar cosmos, for Anaximander, arose from the apeiron.
We may note that so far no instance of apeiron clearly means ’infinite.’ Only
one, Anaximander’s, could possibly involve an infinite extent, and even in that
case it is not clear that the extent is infinite; it may be indefinite or inexhaustible
without being infinite. Anaximander’s stuff is eternal, i.e. always in existence,
but it is not at all clear that a sixth century Greek would have taken ”always”
to mean an infinite amount of time. Whether any Greek of the 8th to 5th cen-
turies BCE conceived of quantities or magnitudes in a way that denoted what
we would call infinity is not certain.
It is sometimes thought that Zeno of Elea (5th century) spoke of the infinite,
but there is good evidence that he had quite a different focus. It is only in the
arguments concerning plurality that are preserved by Simplicius that we find
what may be quotations from Zeno’s work (regarding his arguments concerning
motion and place we have only reports and paraphrases or interpretations).5
In fragments DK29 B1 and B2, Zeno argued ”from saying that multiple (polla,
many) things are, saying opposite things follows.” In particular, if we say that
multiple things are, then we must conclude that ”the same things must be
so large as to be apeira (neuter plural) and so small as to lack magnitude
(megethos).” Zeno was evidently interested in the claim that there are multi-
ple things with spatial magnitude, and it appears from the fragments that he
thought that the possibilities for analyzing the components of spatial magnitude
were the hypothesis that a thing that has spatial magnitude must be composed
of parts with positive spatial magnitude, parts of no magnitude, or some com-
bination of these. If a thing had no magnitude, Zeno argued, it would not
increase (in magnitude) anything to which it was added, nor decrease anything
from which it was removed. Therefore it could not ”be” at all (at least, it could
not ”be” as the spatial thing it was said to be). Nothing with magnitude could
be composed entirely of such things. However, if we assume that the compo-
nents of a spatial thing have positive magnitude, another problem arises. In
measuring such a thing, we would try to ascertain the end of its ”projecting
part” (i.e. the outermost part of the thing). Each such projecting part would
always have its own projecting part, so that the thing would have no ultimate
”extreme” (eschaton). That is, the outer edge of something always has some
thickness, as do the lines on any ruler we might use to measure it; and this
thickness itself can always be divided. Thus the magnitude of a spatial thing,
neuter adjectives, are readily used as substantives in ancient Greek.
4 Kahn ([34]) holds that Anaximander’s apeiron is ”primarily a huge, inexhaustible mass,
stretching away endlessly in every direction.” It must at least be that, but as Richard McKi-
rahan points out in Philosophy Before Socrates, the discussions of Anaximander in Aristotle
and the Peripatetics make clear that the apeiron must also be a stuff of indefinite kind or
quality (33-35).
5 It is possible that some of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion dealt with infinitely long sequences
of steps. Aristotle suggests that they did. Aristotle used the word apeiron to describe these
sequences, but it is not known whether Zeno did. See Aristotle, Physics Z2 [38].
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and thus its exact limits, will not be determinable. There is nothing in this to
suggest that Zeno thought that the claim that there are multiple spatial things
led to the conclusion that such things must be infinitely large. Rather, his de-
scription suggests that the things would be indeterminable, and indeterminate
or indefinite, in size.6
In the philosophy of the fourth century BCE, and arguably as early as Zeno,
an apeiro¯n quantity could not be calculated exactly, at least as long as it was
regarded from the perspective according to which it was apeiro¯n. In fact, Aris-
totle’s argument that a continuous magnitude bounded at both ends could be
traversed in a finite amount of time - despite the fact that it ”contains” an
apeiro¯n number of points, and despite Zeno’s Dichotomy argument - rests pre-
cisely on the notions that the magnitude is not composed of the apeiro¯n number
of points, and that from one perspective it is bounded. Aristotle does not refute
Zeno’s argument, but merely argues that within the framework of his physics,
the question Zeno addresses can be put into different terms. Thus where murios
did not clearly refer to ten thousand, a murios quantity was generally recog-
nized as definite but was not calculated exactly. An apeiro¯n thing or quantity
in Homer or Herodotus might be definite or not, and in later thinkers, especially
in philosophy, the term came to emphasize that aspect of the thing or group or
quantity that was indefinite, indeterminate, or unlimited.
Intermezzo
We shall see momentarily that subsequent reflections on the ultrafinite orbit,
for the most part, around the myrios-apeiron pair, as if around a double star.
Meanwhile, to keep the length of this paper a feasible one, we must skip over
two thousand years of mathematical and philosophical thought (where ultrafini-
tistic themes crop up from time to time in the philosophical and mathematical
debate), and pick up the thread once again well into the twentieth century.
Recent History of UF
The passage from prehistory to the history of UF is difficult to pin down. Per-
haps a bit arbitrarily, we shall say that it starts with the radical criticism of
Brouwer’s Intutionist Programme by Van Dantzig [8] in 1950. 7 This seminal
small paper contains in nuce most of the later motives. Chief among them that
(quoting him verbatim):
- the difference between finite and infinite numbers is not an essential, but a
6For an account of what Zeno showed, and what he may have been trying to show, in these
arguments, see [17], pages 5-7.
7Van Dantzig himself points out that some of his ideas were anticipated by the Dutch
philosopher Mannoury, and by the French mathematician Emil Borel ([32]). Borel observed
that large finite numbers (les nombres inaccessibles) present the same order of difficulties as
the infinite.
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gradual one -.
According to this view, an infinite number is a number that surpasses every-
thing I can ever obtain. One is here reminded of a game inadvertently initiated
by the Greek mathematician Archimedes in his Sand Reckoner (Ψαµµιτες. A
good translation is [33]), a game that is still played nowadays: two fellows, A
and B, trying to beat each other at naming huge numbers. The winner is the
contestant who is able to construct a faster growing primitive recursive func-
tion. The winner is the (temporary) owner of ”infinite numbers” (see on this [1]).
A second major character in this story is the Russian logician Yessenin-Volpin.
In a series of papers (see for instance his 1970 manifesto [13] )he exposes his
views on UF. Unfortunately, in spite of their appeal, his views are difficult to
articulate: there is simply too much there (though, to be sure, David Isles has
made a serious and quite successful attempt to clarify some of Volpin’s tenets
in [11]). One of the fundamental ideas put forth by Volpin is that there is no
uniquely defined natural number series. Volpin’s ruthless attach unmasks the
circularity behind the induction scheme, and leaves us with various not isomor-
phic finite natural number series.
Interestingly, a few years later, Princeton mathematician Ed Nelson had an
epiphany, described in his ”confession” [5]: in a morning of the Fall 1976, in
Canada, Nelson lost his ”pythagorean faith” in the natural numbers. What was
left was nothing more than finite arithmetic terms, and the rules to manipulate
them. Nelson’s Predicative Arithmetics ([6]), albeit an essential steps toward
the re-thinking of mathematics along strictly finitist lines, seems to us not as
radical as Nelson’s amazing vision: why stopping at induction over bounded
formulae? If numbers are no more, and arithmetics is a concrete manipulation
of symbols (a position that could be aptly called ultra-formalist), ”models” of
arithmetics are conceivable, where even the successor operation is not total,
and all induction is either restricted or banished altogether(for an analysis of
Nelson’s arithmetics and for our proposal of an arithmetics for ultra-formalists
see [20]).
Enter Parikh [7]. His celebrated ”Existence and Feasibility in Arithmetics”
(1971) introduces an expanded version of Peano Arithmetic, enriched with a
unary predicate F (where F(x) intended meaning is that x is a feasible number,
in some unspecified sense). Mathematical induction does not apply to F, and a
new axiom is added to PA saying that a very large number is not feasible. More
precisely, the axiom says that the number 21000, where 20 = 1 and 2k+1 = 2
2k ,
is not feasible. Parikh proves, among other important results, that the theory
PA + ¬F (21000) is feasibly consistent : though obviously inconsistent from the
classical standpoint, all proofs exhibiting its inconsistency are unfeasible, in the
sense that the length of any such proof is a number n ≥ 21000.
From the point of view of this history, Parikh achieves at least two goals: first, he
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turns some of the claims of ultrafinitists into concrete verifiable theorems. Sec-
ondly, he paves the way to a new kind of ultrafinitistic proof theory. Parikh’s ap-
proach has been improved by several authors ([?], [?]). Quite recently, Vladimir
Sazonov [10], has made a serious attempt at making more explicit the struc-
ture of Ultrafinitistic Proof Theory.8. Also, Alessandra Carbone and Stephen
Semmes, have investigated the consistency of PA+¬F (21000) and similar theo-
ries from a novel proof theoretical standpoint, involving the combinatorial com-
plexity of proofs ([30]). We shall touch upon these ideas in Section 5.
Parikh’s seminal paper leaves us with a desire for more: knowing that PA +
¬F (21000) is feasibly consistent, there ought to be some way of saying that it
has a model. In other words, the suspicion rises that, were a genuine seman-
tics of ultrafinitistic theory available to us, the celebrated Go˝del’s completeness
theorem (or a finitist version thereof) should hold true. But where to look for
such a semantics? Models are structured sets (or objects in some category with
structure). We must thus turn our sight from proof theory to set theory and
category theory.
On the set-theoretical side, there are at least two major contributions. The
first one is Vopenka’s programme to reform Cantor’s Set Theory, also known
as Alternative Set Theory (AST). AST has been developed for more than three
decades, so even a scanty exposition of his results is not feasible here. We can
just recall the main themes: AST is a phenomenological theory of finite sets.
Some sets can have subclasses that are not themselves sets. Sets of that kind
are ”infinite” in Vopenka’s sense. Here we go back to one of the senses of the
word apeiron, previously described: some sets are (or appear) infinite because
they live outside our perceptual horizon. It should be pointed out that AST is
not, per se, a UF framework. However, Vopenka envisioned the possibility of
”witnessed universes”, i.e. universes where infinite (in his sense) semisets con-
tained in finite sets do exist. These witnessed universes would turn AST into a
”universe of discourse” for ultrafinitism. To our knowledge, though, witnessed
AST has not been developed beyond its initial stage.
There are other variants of set theory with some finitist flavor. For instance,
Andreev and Gordon [2] describe a theory oh Hyper-finite Sets (THS), which
is not incompatible with classical set theory. An interesting fact is that both
AST and THS produce as a by-product a quite natural model of non-standard
analysis, 9 thereby providing at least a good reason for interest in finitistic math
8In the cited paper the absolute character of being a feasible number is asserted, on some
physical ground (Sazonov’s actual position on this issue is more articulate, as it appears from
his recent FOM postings). We do not share this belief. As pointed out elsewhere in this
paper, we think it is important to maintain the notion of contextual feasibility (after all, who
knows for sure what is out there? Perhaps new discoveries in Plank level physics will show
that the estimated upper bound of ”particles” in the universe was way too small. Whereas
logic should be able to account for physical limitations, it should not be enslaved by them.)
9The very large and the very small are indeed intimately related: if one has a consistent
notion of large, unfeasible number n, one automatically gets the ”infinitesimal” 1
n
, via the
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for mainstream mathematicians.
The second set-theoretical approach we are aware of, is the one described in
the book of Shaughan Lavine [15]. Here, a finitistic variant of ZF is introduced,
where the existence of a large number, the Zillion, is posited (again, the reader
may recall, a old motive: the coming back of myrion. Zillion replaces in some
way the missing ℵ0)
Finally, category theory. This is, with one notable exception, a totally un-
charted (but very promising) territory. The exception is a couple of works in
the late seventies and early eighties by the late Jon M. Beck, on using simplicial
and homotopic methods to model finite, concrete analysis [23]. As far as we
understand it, Beck’s core idea is to use the simplicial category△, truncated at
a certain level△[n], to replace the role of the natural number series (or, because
we are here in a categorical framework, the so-called natural number object that
several topoi possess). The truncated simplicial category has enough structure
to carry out some finitistic version of recursion; moreover, its homotopy theory
provides new tools to model finite flow diagrams. 10 Beck’s approach will be
discussed in a later work [20], together with other possible paths using category
theory and the topos approach to realizability in particular. 11
Before moving on to our first sketch of a proposal, let us try to sum up some
lessons we believe can be learned from the foregoing:
• First, the notion of feasibility should be contextual. An object (a term, a
number, a set) is feasible only within a specific context, that specifies the
type of resources available (functions, memory, time, etc.). Thus a full-
blown model theory of UF should provide the framework for a dynamic
notion of feasibility.
• As the contest changes, so does feasibility. What was unfeasible before,
may become feasible now. Perhaps our notion of potential infinity came
as the realization (or faith) that any contest can be transcended.
• The transcendency degrees of feasibility are not necessarily linearly or-
dered. One can envision contests in which what is feasible for A is not
feasible for B, and viceversa.
• Lat, but not least, the pair Murios-Apeiron. Every convincing approach
to UF should be broad enough to encompass both terms. Even better, it
should unify the two streams into a single, flexible framework.
usual construction of the field of fractions Q.
10 As it has been pointed out in a recent posting by Michael Barr on the category list in
appreciation of Beck’s mathematics, addition for the finite calculator is not an associative
operation. Homotopy ”repairs” the lack of associativity by providing ”associativity up to
homotopy” via coherence rules.
11 As it is well known, topoi have an internal logic, which is intuitionistic. One can hope
that, by isolating ”feasible” objects in the realizability topos via a suitable definition of feasible
realizability, a categorical universe of discourse for UF could be, as it were, carved out.
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4 Fuzzy Initial Segments of NN: a model of ul-
trafinitistic arithmetics
In our first model we shall adopt a moderate position, namely we still assume
that ”numbers” exist, at least in the background (a more radical step, where the
term model of arithmetic is de-constructed into its partial fragments, and where
numbers are replaced by finite similarity classes of terms, will be investigated
in [21]).
For the time being, let us imagine a concrete entity (an individual, a finite
physical machine, . . . ), named Amanda, trying to embrace the natural number
series. We shall imagine that we have some way to gauge Amanda’s level of
confidence that a particular number is within her reach. This measure will be
coded by a certain function G from the natural numbers into the [0 1] interval.
For a particular number n, G(n) = 1 shall indicate that n is definitely within
reach, or strongly feasible. On the opposite side of the spectrum, G(n) = 0
means that n is unfeasible, or totally beyond her grasp. All other values in
between will be considered feasible, in some weak sense.
We shall make the assumption that the graspable number series (i.e. the subclass
of natural numbers that are presently not entirely outside Amanda’s reach), is
closed downward and weakly closed under some finite collection of elementary
primitive recursive function F = {f0, f1, . . . fn}. By weakly closed we mean the
following: consider the algebra of closed terms that can be obtained from F
from 0. If t1, . . . , tn are terms in the algebra and G(t1) = . . . = G(tn) = 1 and
f ∈ F is a n-ary function, then G(f(t1, . . . , tn)) > 0. The motivation behind
the foregoing is that it ought not to be possible to discriminate between the
strongly feasible and the unfeasible using any of the functions in F .12
Let us start small: Amanda knows only S, the successor function (or, to be
more accurate, she knows only how to iterate S a number of time, depending
on her actual resources. After a while, she will probably fall asleep, or, in case
she is a machine, run out of RAM). So, the family F is F = {f0 = S}. The
arithmetic world of Amanda is encapsulated by the following definition:
Definition 1 A Fuzzy Initial Segment (FIS for short) of the Natural Number
Series is a function G : N −→ [0 1] such that
1) G(0) = 1 ( 0 is a feasible number!)
2) ∀n G(n+ 1) ≤ G(n) ( G is monotonically decreasing)
12A guiding mental image is the following: think of a ”castle” inhabited by the strongly
feasible numbers. A ”moat” of weakly feasible numbers separates the castle from the vast
world of the unfeasible beyond. The postulate above basically says that by shooting ”darts”
from within the castle one never hits the unfeasible: they all fall into the muddy moat in
between.
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3) ∀n G(n) = 1⇒ G(n+ 1) > 0 (no jumps allowed)
A FIS is strict iff:
4) ∃k G(k) = 0 (not every number is feasible)
People even scantily aware of fuzzy logic will have recognized a FIS as a spe-
cial fuzzy subset of N . The intuition behind the foregoing definition is that a
FIS is downward closed as well as weakly closed with respect to basic counting
0, S0, SS0, SSS0, . . . .
The definition we just gave is a bit too general, at least for most purposes:
it includes some pathological fuzzy initial segments where the rate of decrease
in feasibility may temporarily slow down. 13 We can thus restrict ourselves to
more well behaved FIS:
Definition 2 A regular FIS (RFIS) is a FIS such that the function R(n) =
G(n)−G(n+ 1) is not decreasing, in the feasible segment {n|G(n) > 0}.
A brief note on the last definition: the function R(n) is an important gauge for
a FIS: the one-step feasibility rate change. Our postulate 3) in Definition
1 rules out R(n) = 1, but it is clear that a real-life FIS should have additional
requirements on its rate of feasibility loss. This topic will be elaborated else-
where, as it eventually leads to a general classification of fuzzy initial segments
of arithmetics. For the time being, though, we shall stick to the above definition.
An elementary (but nevertheless interesting) example of a RFIS is given by
the the family {GN (n)}:
(♣) GN (n) = max(1−
n
N
, 0)
This family represent a set of fuzzy initial segments of arithmetic where the
degree of confidence decreases at the same pace 1
N
, till the bottom is reached. If
N ↑ ∞, then the FIS spans the entire natural numbers series; in other words, all
finite natural numbers are feasible.14. Observe that, according to our definition,
only 0 is strongly feasible in (♣). This is admittedly odd, but it can be easily
fixed by starting the decay at some positive number n0.
13 We are not ruling out a priori the possibility of non-monotonic feasibility. Quite to the
contrary: it is perfectly conceivable that within certain contexts the rate at which feasibility
goes down as numbers get bigger will decrease, or even that larger numbers may be considered
more feasible (perhaps their description has low complexity whereas some smaller number
hasn’t. There is here an intriguing connection between Kolmogorov complexity and feasibility,
yet to be explored). Here, we are simply following the old common sense precept: easier things
first.
14The implicit suggestion here is that classical/intuitionistic reasoning could be recovered by
”passing to the limit”: from the ultrafinitistic standpoint this passage to the limit is obtained
by postulating an unbounded set of computational resources.
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Everybody knows that counting by ”adding one” is extremely inefficient: that is
one of the underlying reasons for creating more manageable notations. As in the
mentioned ”name the bigger number game”, the key is in devising fast growing
primitive recursive functions. Once such a function definition is achieved, it is
possible to reach out farther than before. Thus, a new ”fuzzy initial segment” is
obtained. Going back to Amanda, let us assume that a family F = {f0, . . . , fn}
of function is available to her. Let us indicate with T(F ) the set of closed terms
generated by F . The arithmetic world of Amanda is now a fuzzy initial segment
of arithmetics weakly closed under F :
Definition 3 A Fuzzy Initial Segment closed under a family of functions F is
a function G : N −→ [0 1] such that:
1) G(0) = 1
2) G is not increasing
3) if t1, . . . , tk are in T(F ) and f ∈ A is an n-ary function ∀i G(ti) = 1 ⇒
f(t1, . . . , tk) > 0
4) ∃t ∈ T(F ) such that G(t) = 0.
Given two FIS, G and G′, G′ dominates G if ∀k G(k) < G′(k).
The number n such that ∃t ∈ T(F ) (n = length(t) ∧ G(t) > 0) and ∀t′ ∈
T(F )¬ (G(t) > G(t′) > 0 ∧ length(t′) < length(t)), is called the feasibility
radius of the FIS.
The feasibility radius is a gauge of how far out one can go using the given a
notation system.
Notice that a FIS in the sense of the previous definition is just a particular
case of Definition 2, where F = {S}. The feasibility radius is just the maximal
n = SS . . . S0 such that G(n) > 0.
As we have already said, any FIS models a concrete arithmetic world for a
particular entity at a given time. Worlds change, and so do arithmetic worlds.
Amanda can expand hers in at least three ways:
1. either by extending her feasibility radius (perhaps through memory en-
hancers, or yoga . . . ), or
2. by being more creative and elaborating new ways of going farther with
the same resources.
3. Finally, she can move from her current G to a G′ that has exactly the
same radius but such that G′ dominates G (in other words, her grasp on
the feasible segment has gotten sharper).
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Examples of 1 are easy to imagine, and we leave them to the reader. As for 2,
let us go back to (♣): it is clear that the feasibility radius of GN (n) is N − 1.
Now, suppose Amanda realizes that the unary successor notation is quite clumsy
(indeed, sticking to it, most of us would find the number 10000 unfeasible!). Let
us say that she discovers the binary digit notation. Now, define a new FIS as
G′(n) = G(xlog2(n)y+ 1)
Proposition 1 Let G be weakly closed under f(m,n) = m + n + 2. Then G’
above is closed under multiplication. Also, G’ dominates G.
The trivial proof uses the elementary properties of the logarithm: G′(m ∗ n) =
G(xlog2(mn)y) ≥ G(xlog2(m)y+ xlog2(n) + 2). Now, use 3) in Definition 3.
In the last example, Amanda’s grasp has increased exponentially, even though
her memory/storage resources are the same (this trivial example shows the
power hidden in notation systems: through them we can ”handle” otherwise
un-graspable numbers).
As for 3, compare G2N (n) with G
♯
2N
(n) = 1 − 2n2N : their radius with respect
to successor is the same ( huge, even for small N !), but the shape of the FIS
has changed quite a bit. In G♯2N (n), things start out slowly (making the first
numbers almost strongly feasible), and precipitates later on. Although the two
FIS have the same length, G♯2N clearly dominates G2N .
Before moving on, we wish to mention en passant a classification of feasible
numbers into ”size” (small, medium and large), due to Kolmogorov (and taken
up by Sazonov). Assume G is a FIS weakly closed under multiplication and
such that G(2) = 1. Define another FIS by Gs(n) = G(2n) (the superscript
stands for small)
Proposition 2 The FIS Gs(n) is closed under addition.
The fuzzy set S = {n | Gs(n) > 0} is the collection of G-small numbers. Further
classifications can be obtained by refining this method.
Though the arithmetic models we have presented are by no means the most
general, they are still broad enough to encompass not only the ”apeiron” view
of UF, but also the ”murios”. Indeed, a model of arithmetics with a largest
number, such as the one proposed by Mychielski [29]( see for instance the inter-
esting article by Van Bendegem [28]), can be obtained by ”moding out” with
respect to the following equivalence relation:
n ∼ m⇔ (G(n) > 0 ∧G(m) > 0 ∧ n = m) ∨ (G(n) = 0 ∧G(m) = 0)
In plain words, for Amanda every number beyond the horizon is the same num-
ber, aka infinity. Actually, there is yet another equivalence relation producing
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a finite arithmetics model, namely the one that identifies all numbers that are
not strictly feasible. Indeed, any ”defuzzification operator” amongst the ones
investigated by Fuzzy Logic would do. By defuzzifying a FIS one ends up with a
crisp finite arithmetical universe, which describes a concrete arithmetical world
where computational resources are sharply known.
To summarize what we have seen, we can say that the basic arithmetical world
may be enriched in a number of ways:
• by considering a relativized form of feasibility: as the reader has certainly
observed, the numbers that are feasible are the ones that can be reached
from 0 in a small number of steps by ”jumping forward” with the aid of
suitably devised terms.
• by studying definable or even computable/effective Fuzzy Initial Segments,
i.e. by putting some restriction on the function G (the reader has surely
noticed that so far no such restriction has been made).
• by considering a family of FIS, parameterized by a time parameter, rep-
resenting different feasibility contexts in the life of Amanda
• by introducing several ”actors” (say, Amanda’s boyfriend), each equipped
with his/her own FIS. This scenario appears to have some similarities
with multi-agents epistemic logics, but we are unable to establish precise
connections.
We shall not pursue these directions here, although we feel that each one deserves
further analysis. Instead, we will show that these simple models are ”enough”
to provide an adequate semantics for feasibly consistent arithmetics theories.
But first a preliminary analysis of proof theory from the perspective of UF is in
order.
5 Dissipative Proof Theory
In this section we briefly sketch a ”revision” of standard proof theory, which
better accommodates the needs of UF. Ordinary proofs can be unfeasible, in
the eyes of an ultrafinitistic mathematician: their length, or other complexity
measures he/she may want to consider, could potentially turn them into proofs
that would be qualified as ”ideal”, and therefore unacceptable. It is then clear
that we need a way to gauge the degree of convincingness of a proof. At the
same time, this should be done in the broadest generality, so as to encompass
different viewpoints.
Where shall we start? A proof is a tree built out of basic logical rules. Each
rule enables us to transfer the credibility of the premisses into the consequences:
if I believe that A is the case and I also believe B is also the case, then, via
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∧-introduction, I believe that A∧ V is true as well.15 In standard proof theory,
I can apply a rule as many times as I like, or I can choose a different proof
altogether: if the hypothesis is held valid, the final conclusion will also be con-
sidered valid, with the same degree of credibility.
We intend to replace the foregoing implicit assumption by a new proof the-
ory that allows for dissipative deductions, i.e. deduction where some degree of
convincingness may be lost at each steps. Just like classical formal arithmetics
should be seen as a limit case of feasible arithmetics, standard proof theory
should be viewed as a special case of Dissipative Proof Theory, where the
rate of truth loss is always zero, or negligible.16
What we are suggesting here, is that each logical rule is both a ”joint”, through
which subproofs can be melded, and a credibility transfer operator, i.e. a chan-
nel that transforms the credibility of the subproofs into the credibility of their
merger.
Concretely, we need a Truth Transfer Policy, i.e. a policy that prescribes for
each logical rule the degree of credibility of the consequences a a function of the
credibility of the premisses.
In the following we shall work within a Natural Deduction’s framework: ND−
Derivations will be the set of all correct derivation from logical and non logical
axioms. Everything can be rephrased, mutatis mutandis, in other systems of
proof theory. Also, as a ”credibility thermometer”, we shall choose the unit in-
terval I = [0 1], following Zadeh’s fuzzy logic. It goes without saying, though,
that quite different measures of credibility could be adopted, as long as a cor-
responding policy is also introduced.
Definition 4 A Truth Transfer Policy (TTP) P, is an assignment,for each
logical rule R, of a function PR : I
k −→ I, where k is the number of premisses
in the rule. P will obey the following restrictions:
• The TTP of the axioms is the identity id : I → I.
• PR(0, . . . , 0) = 0 for each rule.
• PR(1, . . . , 1) > 0 for each rule.
• PR(p1, . . . , pk) ≤ min(p1, . . . , pk)
Given a TTP P and a derivation p, we can associate an I-value to it, its P-
credibility, by assigning to all the logical and non logical axioms a credibility
15For a view of natural deduction as a system of assertions, the basic reference is Martin
Lo¨f’s analysis in [26]
16The word dissipative is suggested by the following metaphor: think of truth as some kind
of ”heat”, flowing through the derivation, from the leaves (i.e. the premisses). Depending on
the medium through which heat flows, there can be some loss due to dissipation.
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value of 1, and applying P at every steps of the deduction. This recursive pro-
cedure produces a function
FP : NP −Derivations −→ [0 1]
that will be referred to as the P-based credibility measure.
We shall say that A is a feasible consequence of the theory T under the TTP
P iff there is a proof p of A from T such that FP(p) > 0. If FP(p) = 1, then A
is a strong consequence of T .
We shall use the notation T ⊢FP A to say that A is feasibly derivable from
T under F . If the derivation is strong, we shall indicate it as T ⊢!FP A
A theory T is P-feasibly consistent under F there are no feasible proofs un-
der P of ⊥ from T .
Let us briefly see what consequences Definition 5 entails: we have assumed that
P has no credibility jumps, in order to make sure that
1) T ⊢!FP A and T ⊢
!
FP
B implies T ⊢FP A ∧B
2)T ⊢!FP A and T ⊢
!
FP
A⇒ B implies T ⊢FP B
and similarly for the other connectives. In general, it will not be true that
T ⊢FP A and T ⊢FP A⇒ B implies T ⊢FP B: merging already barely feasible
proofs of A and B may go beyond the horizon, constructing an unfeasible proof.
The reader may be a bit puzzled: what is the connection of the above with
the usual way of thinking about feasibility of proofs, namely their length? Our
TTP encompasses this view as a very special case; indeed, looking at the length
of a proof as a measure of its convincingness basically corresponds to assigning
the same constant erosion factor to each logical rule. In other words, the only
impact that a rule application has on the credibility of a proof in progress is
simply the one that results from the increase of size of the proof itself.
To illustrate the foregoing with a rather trivial example, let us assume, for sake
of simplicity, that instead of Natural Deduction we operate with an Hilbert-
style system. Also, in order to simplify matters, let us imagine that only Modus
Ponens has a non trivial dissipative policy. More specifically, if I have a proof of
A of credibility pA and I have a proof of A⇒ B of credibility p(A⇒ B), then a
single-step application of modus ponens will lead to a proof of B of credibility
P(MP ) = f : [0 1]2 −→ [0 1]
where f = max(0,min(p(A⇒B), pA)− E)
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and 0 < E < 1 is the ”constant credibility erosion factor”.
Now, suppose that we have a basic arithmetical theory, say Q, with a feasi-
bility predicate, F (), obeying
F (0), F (n)⇒ F (n+ 1), but ¬F (21000) (no induction on the predicate F !).
It is immediate to check that posing E = 121000 , makes the theory feasibly
consistent: the convincingness (obtained by iterated modus ponens) of F (n)
is only 1 − n21000 . As trivial as this example is, it already reveals a couple of
interesting things:
• first, that for small numbers the credibility is almost equal one, creating,
as it were, the illusion of an indefinite series of feasible numbers. Indeed,
standard Hilbert style proof theory corresponds to setting the constant
erosion factor equal zero;
• secondly, it implicitly suggests where a FIS itself may come from: it is
simply generated by the proof-theoretical discoveries of Amanda. Posing
G(n) = 1− n21000 we recover the trivial FIS described in (♣) of the previous
Section.
The point of view presented in the foregoing could be qualified as local : the
overall credibility of a proof is the result of ”integrating” over all the one-step
credibility changes caused by applying such and such rule in the course of the
proof.
It is quite possible that non-local measures of credibility might become rele-
vant as well. For instance, Carbone and Semmes have advocated a measure of
complexity of proofs based on the number of cycles in the logical flow graph of
the proof itself (see [30]). In turn, one could take their measure, compose it with
a notion of feasibility for natural numbers, and obtain a credibility measure of
proofs. Such a measure is non local, at least at first sight; it is not clear to us
whether it could ever be recovered as a TTP-grounded measure through some
kind of roundabout procedure, but it seems quite unlikely at this stage. At any
event, this order of considerations implicitly suggests the following definition:
Definition 5 A general credibility measure (GCM) for derivations is simply a
fuzzy characteristic function F : ND −Derivations −→ [0 1]
A GCM F is well-behaved iff T ⊢F A ⇔ T,¬A is F -consistent.
17
A GCM F is factorable iff there exist a complexity measure
17We omit for brevity the definition of feasible consequnce, feasible consistency, etc. They
are just the same as in the case of a GCM that is generated by a TTP (see page 20).
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c : ND −Derivations −→ N
and a FIS
G : N −→ [0 1]
such that F = G ◦ c:
N // [0 1]
ND −Derivations
ggOOOOOOOOOOOOO
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In his proposal for an ultrafinitistic proof theory (see again [10]), Sazonov in-
troduces two restrictions to ordinary proof theory: proofs must be physically
realizable, and normal (or, which is equivalent, cut-free if one uses Gentzen’s
approach). To us, the first prescription needs to be formalized, as it is not ab-
solute (feasibility is contextual!). This can be easily accomplished by choosing
the GCM obtained from a distinguished FIS (representing here the semi-set of
feasible, i.e constructible numbers on a concrete machine), and using as the
complexity measure the standard ’number of symbols”. As for his second re-
striction, namely normality of proofs, it can be absorbed by the following ob-
servation: suppose one has a GCM F :
ND −Derivations −→ [0 1]
and a computable map
T : ND −Derivations −→: ND −Derivations
one can define a new GCM by composition
ND −Derivations //
((P
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
PP
ND −Derivations
vvnn
nn
nn
nn
nn
nn
n
[0 1]
Indeed, the schema above seems to underly Sazonov’s choice. Why banish-
ing a rule in the first place? A sensible answer is that (as it has been pointed
out in several quarters) the cut rule ”hides” the actual complexity of a deriva-
tion. By ”unwrapping” it, one has a better sense of how complicated the proof
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actually is. The unwrapping is accomplished precisely by setting T above as the
standard cut-elimination procedure.
We have just barely introduced the bare bones of Dissipative Proof Theory.
We just wish to remark that the notion of TTP forces a paradigm shift even in
the very way one thinks of proofs: derivations, from being barren trees, become
decorated. 18.
Question 1 Which factorable credibility measures are of the form FP for a
suitable TTP P ?
Question 2 The notion of well-behaved CGM appears to be critical (see next
Section). It would thus be important to know which TTP are such that their
generated GCM are well-behaved. Also, which measures of complexity and FIS
combine to form well-behaved GCM?
What we have seen in this Section has to do with credibility, not Aristotelian-
Tarskian truth. Nevertheless, it is clear that to re-establish a comfortable paral-
lel between provability and truth, between what-can-be-proved and what-is-out-
there, a careful revision of the core foundations of Model Theory is necessary.
This is our goal in the next Section.
6 Vague Truth: a semantics a` la Tarski for fea-
sibly consistent theories
Before we begin, let us pause a moment and point out that the very distinction
between syntax and semantics, the cornerstone of classical logic, is suspect from
an ultrafinitistic viewpoint. To be sure, even from a more conservative construc-
tivist perspective, people have raised a number of objections against the dualism
syntax-semantics (Jean-Yves Girard has recently written on this pivotal issue
in [27]). All these objections remain true a fortiori for ultrafinitism (a Tarski-
free semantics for arithmetics inspired by formal games will be described in [21]).
So, why even bother trying to establish a tarskian semantics for feasibly consis-
tent theories? AS we declared in the introduction, our chief goal is to provide
a bridge between the classical world mathematics and the world-to-be of ultra-
finitism. As Tarskian semantics, grounded in Set Theory, is pervasive, it seems
reasonable to start from there. Moreover, we would like to turn the informal
and intuitive models of Section 4 into formal ones, thus providing a way to talk
about feasibly consistent theories without being hampered by the ”bureaucracy
of syntax” ( we are borrowing here the colorful expression coined by Girard).
18 A note in passing for the categorical-minded reader: this suggests that the topic of
Dissipative Proof Theory could possibly benefit from an injection of ideas and method from
Enriched Category Theory
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The Tarskian notion of satisfaction, upon which the entire cathedral of standard
model theory hinges, is unfit to provide a semantics for UF. Indeed, as it stands,
it cannot even accommodate traditional constructivism, and we are here in a
territory far more ”picky” than all brands of liberal constructivism (i.e. con-
structivism that allows for potential infinity in its arguments) can possibly be.
We thus need to revise the ”rules” of satisfaction, and replace the abstract
notion of truth underpinning the Tarskian definition with a more realistic one.
The key is in the TTP introduced in the last Section:19 the TTP for a spe-
cific connective should act as an lower bound for the ”degree of truth” in a
given model. Assume in a model M (yet to be defined) A holds with truth
degree pA, and B with degree pB (where pA, pB ∈ [0 1]). The degree of truth of
A∧B should be at least the degree of truth of its proof from the premisses A and
B using ∧-introduction. In other words, we are not ruling out the possibility
that in M additional credibility may be available for A∧B through some kind
of evidence; what we are saying is that its degree of truth should be at least the
one inferred using a one-step proof from A and B.
Definition 6 Let L be a first-order language and P an assigned Truth Transfer
Policy. A structure for (L,P) is an n-tuple M = (D, ck, fi, Pj) where domain,
constants and function symbols are interpreted the usual way, whereas each n-
ary predicate P becomes a fuzzy subset of (D)n: P : (D)n −→ [0 1]
Given an assignment s of the variables, we say that M satisfies the atomic
predicate P (x1, . . . , xn) iff P(s(x1), . . . , s(xn)) > 0. In symbols, (M, s) |= P . If
the evaluation is 1, then we say that M strongly satisfies P ((M, s) |=! P ).
Satisfaction is extended to arbitrary predicates by posing constraints to the shape
of their corresponding fuzzy subsets (we shall present satisfaction rules only for
the complete set {∧, ¬, ∃} ):
1) P(x1, . . . , xn) ∧ Q(y1, . . . , ym) ≥ T∧−intro(P(x1, . . . , xn),Q(y1, . . . , ym))
2) ¬P(x1, . . . , xn) = 1−P(x1, . . . , xn)
3) ∃x P(x) ≥ T∃−intro(P(c)), where c is any constant in M.
A T-modelM for a theory T is a structure such that all axioms of T are strongly
true in M.
19In the following, we shall restrict ourselves to TTP-generated deduction systems, as those
system give us ”control” on the flow of truth. Also, for sake of simplicity, we shall confine
ourselves to a subset of ND which includes rules only for the set {∧, ¬, ∃} (classically, this
set is complete). To which extent our arguments can b lifted to more general context is not
clear at present.
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A comment to the above is in order: the notion of satisfaction in the foregoing
definition is (as the careful reader has certainly not failed to observe) strictly
coupled with a specific TTP . This may be puzzling at first, but it suffices to see
that standard first-order semantics does exactly the same thing, only in disguise.
Indeed, Tarski’s truth is simply a particular case of the previous definition in
which the underlying TTP is assumed to be the trivial one, i.e zero-decay:
within classical logic truth is preserved in its entirety at every logical step.
Definition 6 gives ”legal status” to FIS as models of theories. Recall once again
the theory T0 = Q+ ¬F (2
1000) of the previous section. Consider the structure
M′ = (N,=, S,+, ∗, G), where G is the FIS G(n) = 1 −
n
21000 (the interpreta-
tion of equality is the usual one). M0 is a model of T0, according to Definition
6. Similarly, one can construct models for other arithmetical theories enriched
with a feasibility predicate.
A good semantics ought to be at the very least sound. This is indeed the
case:
Proposition 3 Soundness. Let T be a first order theory. If T ⊢T A, then for
every T-model M of T , M |= A
The proof is, just like its standard counterpart, by induction on the complexity
of A. 
Notice that something more can be extracted by the last proposition: the in-
equality holds for each proof of A from T .
Corollary 1 A(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ min{FT(pA)}, where pA denotes a proof of A
from T .
The last inequality implicitly suggests that somewhere there must be a model
where equality holds, i.e. a model where the degree of truth is exactly what one
gets by choosing, as it were, the ”best” proof available. This is indeed the case,
when one consider the familiar construction of the term model, a key ingredient
in the Henkin’s version of the completeness theorem for FOL. We are ready to
establish an ultrafinitistic version of the completeness theorem.
Proposition 4 Completeness. Let T be a TTP such that the corresponding
GMC is well-behaved. If for every T-model M of T M |= A, then T ⊢T A.
Sketch of proof: if it is not true that T ⊢T A, then the theory T = T
⋃
{¬A} is
F (T)-feasibly consistent (here the well-behavior of T is needed). The goal is to
show that this theory has a model, thereby contradicting the assumption.
Just like in the standard completeness theorem, we can construct a special
model, the term model M0, of a feasibly consistent completion of the theory
T + ¬A. The key is defining truth in M0: the value of a given predicate
AM (x1, . . . , xn) will be the minimum credibility value over all F (T)-feasible
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proofs of AM (x1, . . . , xn) from T . If no such proofs exists, one can ”feasibly
complete” M0 by adding either A
M (x1, . . . , xn) or its negation to it (unless, of
course, T feasibly proves the negation, in which case there is no need to expand
T ). In other words, the construction mimics the familiar construction of the
term model, but where the role of consistent completion is taken by feasible
consistency. Indeed, Henkin’s proof should be recoverable when one ”passes to
the classical limit”. 
Before we conclude this Section, we would like to remark that the notion of
feasible consistency is akin to the so-called para-consistent theories, studied by
several authors ([40]). Indeed, in our Definition 6, a structure can satisfy a
formula and its negation at the same time. However, in our setting, it is not
the logic that has changed, as in para-consistent systems. It is the very notion
of deducibility and truth that has been ”upgraded”, to account for more strin-
gent requirements than either classical logic or intuitionistic one can provide.
It would still be useful to see if a bridge between these two approaches can be
drawn. Much remains to be done here . . .
7 Cantorian Nanotechnology: Miniaturizing
Cantor’s Paradise
We have just seen that it is possible to ”miniaturize” the notion of natural
number series and, through a suitable emendation of syntax and semantics,
view these objects as genuine nano-models of standard arithmetical theories.
In a metaphorical way, this is a bit like Nanotechnology, only applied to Logic
instead of Engineering: choose a macroscopic object, and strive to create a mi-
croscopic clone, all the while retaining its salient properties.
In the same spirit, one can think of the (bounded) finite as a microscopic world,
and the transfinite (or even the unbounded finite) as the macroscopic one. The
challenge then seems to be: to what extent can we miniaturize familiar infinitary
structures? For instance, can we create an entire theory of transfinite cardinals
once we have a finitary copy of Ω0 via a FIS? These cardinals would form a
ladder of transcendency degrees of finiteness, just as the alephs gauge the size
of standard infinite sets.
This program should by no means remain confined to structures. Instead, it
should attempt to miniaturize basic mathematical and meta-mathematical re-
sults as well. For instance, as we have seen in the last Section, a coherent
ultrafinitistic version of the celebrated completeness theorem can be formu-
lated (possibly different ones: we are not making any claim that our account
is the only possible route). What about the incompleteness theorems? Or the
Lowenheim-Skolem theorem? Armed with a notion of satisfaction such as the
one we have just described, one could start the exploration of concrete first-
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order mathematical theories (such as the theory of infinite dimensional vector
spaces) that do not afford conventional finite models.
In our belief, this program, which we would like to refer to as Cantorian
Nanotechnology, is a viable channel of investigation. At the very least, it will
give us a better sense on the real boundaries (assuming there are any) between
the finite and the infinite. If successful, it could provide us with a cornucopia of
new entities that may have an impact in the way we model our physical world
20and our very selves.
Last, but by no means least, Cantorian Nanotechnology could be an attempt
to move beyond the lasting debate between constructivists of all brands and
staunch defenders of Cantor’s Paradise: it may turn out, after all, that the
beautiful land that Cantor created for the endless joy of mathematicians, can
be faithfully reproduces at the finite scale.
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